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    MLB Wesley Woodyard ankle will play after missing some practice time. Vandome, John McBrewster 9781154594003 1154594009 , May Alden Ward 9781158870882 1158870884 - Geschichte Der U-Boot-Klasse T, Geschichte Der U-Boot-Klasse S, Taciturn-Klasse, Triton-Klasse, Orp Orze, Quelle Wikipedia, Bucher Gruppe 9781159133276 1159133271 - Forschungsanstalt Geisenheim, Bundesinstitut Fur Risikobewertung, Bundesministerium Fur Ernahrung, Bucher Gruppe 9786130048952 6130048955 , Frederic P. Some nonpersistent agents, such as most pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene, blood gases, and nonpersistent nerve gases e. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp..

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    Weapons of mass destruction PDF generated using the open source mwlib toolkit. The scope and application of the term has evolved and been disputed, often signifying more politically than technically. Coined in reference to aerial bombing with chemical explosives, it has come to distinguish large-scale weaponry of other technologies, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear. This differentiates the term from more technical ones such as chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons CBRN. Who can think without horror of what another widespread war would mean, waged as it would be with all the new weapons of mass destruction? Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and progressing through the Cold War, the term came to refer more to non-conventional weapons. That exact phrase, says Safire, was also used by Bernard Baruch in 1946 in a speech at the United Nations probably written by Herbert Bayard Swope. The lecture was delivered to the Foreign Service and the State Department, on 17 September 1947. The lecture is reprinted in The Open Mind New York: Simon and Schuster, 1955. The term was also used in the introduction to the hugely influential US Government Document known as NSC-68 written in April 1950. Bush, used the term in an 1989 speech to the United Nations, using it primarily in reference to chemical arms. This period coincided with an increasing threat to U. With the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and 1991 Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs became a particular concern of the first Bush Administration. This fear reached a crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that became the primary justification for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. However, no WMD were found in Iraq. Instead, international law has been used with respect to the specific categories of weapons within WMD, and not to WMD as a whole. The abbreviations NBC for nuclear, biological and chemical or CBR chemical, biological, radiological are used with regards to battlefield protection systems for armored vehicles, because all three involve insidious toxins that can be carried through the air and can be protected against with vehicle air filtration systems. The NBC definition has also been used in official U. Testimony of one such soldier expresses the same viewpoint. Moussaoui was indicted and tried for the use of airplanes as WMD. There are eight countries that have declared they possess nuclear weapons and are known to have tested a nuclear weapon, only five of which are members of the NPT. The eight are China, France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Israel is considered by most analysts to have nuclear weapons numbering in the low hundreds as well, but maintains an official policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither denying nor confirming its nuclear status. While the truth is unknown, the November 2007 NIE on Iran stated that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited stockpiles of nuclear arms following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but relinquished them to the Russian Federation. Countries with access to nuclear weapons through nuclear sharing agreements include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. North Korea has claimed to have developed and tested nuclear devices. Although outside sources have been unable to unequivocally support the state's claims, North Korea has officially been identified to have nuclear weapons. Weapon of mass destruction 7 United States politics Due to the indiscriminate impact of WMD, the fear of a WMD attack has shaped political policies and campaigns, fostered social movements, and has been the central theme of many films. Support for different levels of WMD development and control varies nationally and internationally. Yet understanding of the nature of the threats is not high, in part because of imprecise usage of the term by politicians and the media. Fear of WMD, or of threats diminished by the possession of WMD, has long been used to catalyze public support for various WMD policies. They include mobilization of pro- and anti-WMD campaigners alike, and generation of popular political support. More recently, the threat of potential WMD in Iraq was used by President George W. Bush to generate public support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. There was almost no dissent on the issue. Knight-Ridder and its terrific reporters Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay. Some of the rockets contained extremely deteriorated nerve agent. The CISSM report notes that poor coverage resulted less from political bias among the media than from tired journalistic conventions. Most media outlets represented WMD as a monolithic menace, failing to adequately distinguish between weapons programs and actual weapons or to address the real differences among chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons. The study focused on populations in two coalition countries Australia and USA and one opposed to the war Germany. Results showed that US citizens generally did not correct initial misconceptions regarding WMD, even following disconfirmation; Australian and German citizens were more responsive to retractions. Dependence on the initial source of information led to a substantial minority of Americans exhibiting false memory that WMD were indeed discovered, while they were not. This led to three conclusions: 1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they are subsequently disconfirmed, can assist in the creation of false memories in a substantial proportion of people. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the news stories are about. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred. A poll conducted between June and September 2003 asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They were also asked which media sources they relied upon. Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News were three times as likely to believe that evidence of WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more likely than those who primarily watched CBS. According to David Kay, who appeared before the US House Armed Services Committee to discuss these badly corroded munitions, they were leftovers, many years old, improperly stored or destroyed by the Iraqis. But they are local hazards. They are not a major, you know, weapon of mass destruction. Their threat is a source of unease, security, and pride to different people. The anti-WMD movement is embodied most in nuclear disarmament, and led to the formation of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in 1957. Risks of nuclear conflict, proliferation, and terrorism were seen as substantial. While maintenance of a nuclear US arsenal was considered above average in importance, there was widespread support for a reduction in the stockpile, and very little support for developing and testing new nuclear weapons. A majority also believed the US should be more forthcoming with its biological research and its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment of nuclear arms reduction, and incorrectly thought the US was a party to various non-proliferation treaties. A Russian opinion poll conducted on 5 August 2005 indicated half the population believes new nuclear powers have the right to possess nuclear weapons. WMD in popular culture Weapons of mass destruction and their related impacts have been a mainstay of popular culture since the beginning of the Cold War, as both political commentary and humorous outlet. At the time, it was rendered as magenta, and was set on a blue background. As a result of research, a new radiation hazard symbol was developed to be placed near the most dangerous parts of radiation sources featuring a skull, someone running away, and using the color red rather than yellow as the background. Stockpiles of chemical munitions including sarin and mustard agents were found, but none were considered to be in a usable condition due to corrosion. Retrieved 24 February 2007. Retrieved 8 May 2007. Retrieved 21 November 2010. Moeller, Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004. In Radius Engineering International Inc. Retrieved 20 December 2010. These tables describe the effects of various nuclear blast sizes. Thermal burns represent injuries to an unprotected person. The legend describes the data. Entomological insect warfare is also considered a type of Biological Weapon. Biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over an adversary, either by threats or by actual deployments. Like some of the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups. In the latter case, or if a nation-state uses it clandestinely, it may also be considered bioterrorism. Toxins and Psychochemical weapons are often referred to as midspectrum agents. Unlike bioweapons, these midspectrum agents do not reproduce in their host and are typically characterized by shorter incubation periods. The rationale behind this treaty, which has been ratified or acceded to by 165 countries as of 2011, is to prevent a biological attack which could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian fatalities and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure. A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms on which other nations or groups interact with it. Biological weapons allow for the potential to create a level of destruction and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons, relative to their mass and cost of development and storage. Therefore, biological agents may be useful as strategic deterrents in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield. Some biological agents smallpox, Biological warfare pneumonic plague have the capability of person-to-person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent s may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. While containment of BW is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations. Many examples are recorded from antiquity. In 184 BC, Hannibal of Carthage had clay pots filled with venomous snakes and instructed his soldiers to throw the pots onto the decks of Pergamene ships. Historical accounts from medieval Europe detail the use of infected animal carcasses, by Mongols, Turks and other groups, to infect enemy water supplies. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged Crimean city of Kaffa. It has been speculated that this operation may have been responsible for the advent of the Black Death in Europe. It is suspected by Ward Churchill, but not confirmed, that BW was used against Native Americans at other times as well. The advent of the germ theory and advances in bacteriology brought a new level of sophistication to the theoretical use of bio-agents in war. The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention BWC extended the ban to almost all production, storage and transport. However, both the Soviet Union and Iraq, at a minimum, secretly defied the treaty and continued research and production of offensive biological weapons, despite being signatories to it. Major public proof of the Soviet program, called Biopreparat, came when Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, its first deputy director, defected to the U. In its military campaigns, the Japanese used BW on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment has been largely viewed as ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems. However, firsthand accounts testify that the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs and newer estimates suggest over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks. In response to suspected BW development in Nazi Germany, the U. Fear of the German program turned out to be vastly exaggerated. The center for U. Research carried out in the U. This view was challenged by China and North Korea, who accused the U. In 1972, the U. The argument is that biological weapons cannot be controlled: the weapon could backfire and harm the army on the offensive, perhaps having even worse effects than on the target. An agent like smallpox or other airborne viruses would almost certainly spread worldwide and ultimately infect the user's home country. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to bacteria. For example, anthrax can easily be controlled and even created in a garden shed. Also, using microbial methods, bacteria can be suitably modified to be effective in only a narrow environmental range, the range of the target that distinctly differs from the army on the offensive. Thus only the target might be affected adversely. The weapon may be further used to bog down an advancing army making them more vulnerable to counter attack by the defending force. Biological warfare Anti-personnel Ideal characteristics of a biological agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines, and availability of an effective and efficient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent ability of the agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage may also be desirable, particularly for military applications, and the ease of creating one is often considered. Control of the spread of the agent may be another desired characteristic. The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons can often be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage and delivery in an effective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose significant problems. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is not considered transmissible from person to person, and thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A large-scale attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1. At this size, conductive powders tend to aggregate because of electrostatic charges, hindering dispersion. So the material must be treated to insulate and neutralize the charges. The weaponized agent must be resistant to degradation by rain and ultraviolet radiation from sunlight, while retaining the ability to efficiently infect the human lung. There are other technological difficulties as well, chiefly relating to storage of the weaponized agent. Agents considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp.. These toxins and the organisms that produce them are sometimes referred to as select agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program. The former US biological warfare program categorized its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal Agents Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Botulinum toxin or Incapacitating Agents Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, Staphylococcal enterotoxin B. Biological weapons also target fisheries as well as water-based vegetation. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics epidemics among plants. When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases. Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare and chemical warfare because they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioregulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was responsible for transport of all chemical, biological, radiological nuclear materials. Scorched earth tactics or destroying livestock and farmland were carried out in the Vietnam war cf. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators i. In 1962, the counterinsurgency school in Vietnam moved to Okinawa. The tests conducted there were aimed at both human, animal, and plant reaction to BW. Harris continued that, The Okinawa anti-crop research project may lend some insight to the larger projects 112 sponsored. The Okinawa tests evidently were fruitful. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. In the First World War, German agents were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the 1950s, the United States had a field trial with hog cholera. Entomological warfare Entomological warfare EW is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era. EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program. EW may employ insects in a direct attack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and then dispersing the insects over target areas. Another type of EW is a direct insect attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The final method uses uninfected insects, such as bees, wasps, etc. The aim was to prevent and minimize the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous infectious diseases as well as the treat of alleged use of biological weapons against BTWC States Parties. Role of public health and disease surveillance It is important to note that all classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans. By making these data Biological warfare available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease. Identification of bioweapons The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial state capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians. The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive. The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapons attacks in the Netherlands. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland 1940s. Operation Cauldron off Stornoway, 1952. The trawler Carella accidentally sailed through a cloud of pneumonic plague bacilli Yersinia pestis during this trial. It was kept under covert observation until the incubation period had elapsed but none of the crew fell ill. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Page 265 to 266. Ken Alibek and K Handelman 1999 , Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Trade From the Inside by the Man Who Ran It, New York, NY: Random House. Retrieved 25 December 2008. Six-legged Soldiers: Using Insects as Weapons of War, Oxford University Press, USA, 2008, pp. In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, Ganguli-Mitra A, de Vriend H eds Synthetic biology. The technoscience and its societal conse- quences. In Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance. Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology. Retrieved 4 September 2010. Buller, The potential use of genetic engineering to enhance orthopox viruses as bioweapons. Bradford Science and Technology Report No. Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease. Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, 1989. Chief of Counsel for the American Military Tribunals at Nurember, 1946. Jackson and Jennifer L. Siegel eds Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society. Is all fair in biological warfare? Army Medical Institute of Infectious Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland April 2005. None of these fall under the term conventional weapons which are primarily effective due to their destructive potential. Chemical warfare does not depend upon explosive force to achieve an objective. Rather it depends upon the unique properties of the chemical agent weaponized. A lethal agent is designed to injure or incapacitate the enemy, or deny unhindered use of a particular area of terrain. Defoliants are used to quickly kill vegetation and deny its use for cover and concealment. It can also be used against agriculture and livestock to promote hunger and starvation. With proper protective equipment, training, and decontamination measures, the primary effects of chemical weapons can be overcome. Many nations possess vast stockpiles of weaponized agents in preparation for wartime use. The offensive use of living organisms such as anthrax is considered biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; however, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by living organisms e. Under this Convention, any toxic chemical, regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited an important legal definition known as the General Purpose Criterion. The entire class known as Lethal Unitary Chemical Agents and Munitions have been scheduled for elimination by the CWC. These may only be produced or used for research, medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes i. Examples include nerve agents, ricin, lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100 g must be notified to the OPCW and a country can have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these chemicals. Examples include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to sarin but which is also used as a flame retardant and Thiodiglycol which is a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of mustard gas but is also widely used as a solvent in inks. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin. Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosgene is an important precursor in the manufacture of plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant. The OPCW must be notified of, and may inspect, any plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year. Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these agents during battle were relatively unrefined and inefficient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the mainly static troop positions which were characteristic features of trench warfare. Germany was the first to produce chemical agents. Chemical warfare 30 Chemical warfare agents A chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare agent CWA. About 70 different chemicals have been used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th and 21st-centuries. These agents may be in liquid, gas or solid form. Liquid agents are generally designed to evaporate quickly; such liquids are said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many chemical agents are made volatile so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly. The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was not toxicity, but development of agents that can affect a target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed mustard gas. Mustard gas easily penetrates leather and fabric to inflict painful burns on the skin. Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. The distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances is not fixed, but relies on a statistical average called the LD50. Persistency One way to classify chemical warfare agents is according to their persistency, a measure of the length of time that a chemical agent remains effective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classified as persistent or nonpersistent. Agents classified as nonpersistent lose effectiveness after only a few minutes or hours or even only a few seconds. Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent, as are highly volatile agents such as sarin and most other nerve agents. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to be taken over and controlled very quickly. Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent deployment, the agent is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the mist produced by an aerosol can. In this form not only the gaseous part of the agent around 50% but also the fine aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in the skin. Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations almost instantly in order to be effective one breath should contain a lethal dose of the agent. To achieve this, the primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The contamination in the target area is only low or not existent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not detectable anymore. By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires shielding for extended periods of time. Non-volatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore present primarily a contact hazard. The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to 1—mm increasing the falling speed and therefore about 80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting in heavy contamination. This implies, that persistent deployment does not aim at annihilating the enemy but to constrain him. Possible targets include enemy flank positions averting possible counterattacks , artillery regiments, commando posts or supply lines. Possible weapons to be used are wide spread, because the fast delivery of high amounts is not a critical factor. A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents. These comprise a common agent mixed with thickeners to provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for this kind of use include airfields, due to the increased persistency and difficulty of decontaminating affected areas. Chemical warfare Classes Chemical weapons are inert agents that come in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve. The cells then uses anaerobic respiration, creating excess lactic acid and metabolic acidosis. Causes severe stinging of the eyes and temporary blindness. Extremely persistent in soil and water and on most surfaces; contact hazard. Causes peripheral nervous system effects that are the opposite of those seen in nerve agent poisoning. Duration is typically 72 to 96 hours. Some batches of Agent Orange, for instance, used by the United States in Vietnam, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange itself, have long-term cancer effects and for causing genetic damage leading to serious birth deformities. Their use is classified as biological warfare. Toxins produced by living organisms are considered chemical weapons, although the boundary is blurry. Toxins are covered by the Biological Weapons Convention. The most common techniques include munitions such as bombs, projectiles, warheads that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate from low-flying aircraft. Developments in the techniques of filling and storage of munitions have also been important. Although there have been many advances in chemical weapon delivery since World War I, it is still difficult to achieve effective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric conditions because many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus, weather observations and forecasting are essential to optimize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring friendly forces. Dispersion Dispersion is placing the chemical agent upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemination, so that the material is most efficiently used. Dispersion is the simplest technique of delivering an agent to its target. The most common techniques are munitions, bombs, projectiles, spray tanks and warheads. Dispersion of chlorine in World War I World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual first chemical ammunition was the French 26—mm cartouche suffocante rifle grenade, fired from a flare carbine. The Germans on the other hand tried to increase the effect of 10. Its use went unnoticed by the British when it was used against them at Neuve Chapelle in October 1914. Hans Tappen, a chemist in the Heavy Artillery Department of the War Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch at German General Headquarters, the use of the tear-gases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide. A shortage of shells limited the first use against the Russians at Bolim—w on 31 January 1915; the liquid failed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the experiment went unnoticed by the Allies. The first effective use were when the German forces at the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened cylinders of chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across enemy lines. While simple, this technique had numerous disadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylinders to the front-line positions from where the gas would be released was a lengthy and difficult logistical task. Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line, posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells. Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the wind was fickle, as at Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties. Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy time to protect themselves, though many soldiers found the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made the gas doubly effective, as, in addition to damaging the enemy physically, it also had a psychological effect on the intended victims. Although it produced limited results in World War I, this technique shows how simple chemical weapon dissemination can be. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing with gas in cylinders. First, gas shells were independent of the wind and increased the effective range of gas, making any target within reach of guns vulnerable. The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difficulty of achieving a killing concentration. Each shell had a small gas payload and an area would have to be subjected to saturation bombardment to produce a cloud to match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem was the Livens Projector. This was effectively a large-bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylinders themselves as projectiles - firing a 14—kg cylinder up to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of cylinders with the range of artillery. Over the years, there were some refinements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chemical artillery rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large number of small clouds of the chemical agent would form directly on the target. Aerial photograph of a German gas attack on Russian forces circa 1916 Chemical warfare Thermal dissemination Thermal dissemination is the use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical agents. This technique, developed in the 1920s, was a major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in that it allowed significant quantities of an agent to be disseminated over a considerable distance. Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating chemical agents today. Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not particularly efficient. First, a percentage of the agent is lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and difficult to control sizes. For flammable aerosols, the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called flashing. Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third of the time. Despite a great deal of study, flashing is still not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would be a major technological advance. Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon development, in part because standard munitions can be adapted to carry the agents. Aerodynamic dissemination Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent from an aircraft, allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major development in chemical agent dissemination, originating in the mid-1960s. This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the flashing effect and theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In actuality, the altitude of dissemination, wind direction and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft greatly influence particle size. Significant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in fluid dynamics, computer modeling, and weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a target. Soviet chemical weapons canisters from a stockpile in Albania Chemical warfare 36 Protection against chemical warfare Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and detecting, very early, the signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a wide range of intelligence disciplines, such as economic analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment, human intelligence HUMINT such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from satellites, aircraft and drones IMINT ; examination of captured equipment TECHINT ; communications intercepts COMINT ; and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical agents themselves MASINT. Since industrial accidents can cause dangerous chemical releases e. In civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties of HAZMAT organizations, which most commonly are part of fire departments. Detection has been referred to above, as a technical MASINT discipline; specific military procedures, which are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on the equipment, expertise, and personnel available. When chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound, with specific warnings over emergency broadcasts and the like. There may be a warning to expect an attack. If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes there is a serious threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle William, which means closing all openings to outside air, running breathing air through filters, and possibly starting a system that continually washes down the exterior surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or a toxic chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate defensive measures. The US military defines various levels of MOPP mission-oriented protective posture from mask to full chemical resistant suits; Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to include a fully independent air supply, rather than the filters of a gas mask. Collective protection allows continued functioning of groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which may be fixed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and tape, although if the protection needs to be continued for any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an air supply, typically a scaled-up version of a gas mask. Some nonpersistent agents, such as most pulmonary agents such as chlorine and phosgene, blood gases, and nonpersistent nerve gases e. In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for people than equipment, since people may be immediately affected and treatment is the action required. It is a requirement when people have been contaminated with persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying mustard gas, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German bombing on 2 December 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet seamen in tight-fitting blankets. For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of neutralizing agent will be needed; e. In other cases, a specific chemical decontaminant will be required. The use of toxic materials has historically been viewed with mixed emotions and moral qualms in the West. The practical and ethical problems surrounding poison warfare appeared in ancient Greek myths about Hercules' invention of poison arrows and Odysseus's use of toxic projectiles. There are many instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and Roman historical texts; the earliest example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha's water supply with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece, about 590 BC. There are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars, but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for ethical reasons. It was signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in the treaty and it never went into effect. To the right is a summary of the nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles or are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW research programs. Notable examples include United States and Russia. Former US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed the signing ratification of a treaty banning the use chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the Convention. Chemical warfare The CWC was ratified by the Senate that same month. Since then, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and India have declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical weapon stockpiles, and destroyed about a third of them. Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and Russia are supposed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of chemical weapons by 2012. A good example of early chemical warfare was the late Stone Age 10 000 BC hunter-gatherer societies in Southern Africa, known as the San. These poisons were mainly derived from scorpion or snake venom, but it is believed that some poisonous plants were also utilized. The arrow was fired into the target of choice, usually an antelope the favourite being an eland , with the hunter then tracking the doomed animal until the poison caused its collapse. Ancient Greek myths about Hercules poisoning his arrows with the venom of the Hydra Monster are the earliest references to toxic weapons in western literature. Homer's epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, allude to poisoned arrows used by both sides in the legendary Trojan War Bronze Age Greece. Ancient Greek historians recount that Alexander the Great encountered poison arrows and fire incendiaries in India at Indus Basin in the 4th century BC. In the 2nd century BC, writings of the Mohist sect in China describe the use of bellows to pump smoke from burning balls of mustard and other toxic vegetables into tunnels being dug by a besieging army. Other Chinese writings dating around the same period contain hundreds of recipes for the production of poisonous or irritating smokes for use in war along with numerous accounts of their use. The earliest recorded use of gas warfare in the West dates back to the 5th century BC, during the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. Spartan forces besieging an Athenian city placed a lighted mixture of wood, pitch, and sulfur under the walls hoping that the noxious smoke would incapacitate the Athenians, so that they would not be able to resist the assault that followed. Sparta was not alone in its use of unconventional tactics in ancient Greece: Solon of Athens is said to have used hellebore roots to poison the water in an aqueduct leading from the River Pleistos around 590 BC during the siege of Kirrha. However, his report is not firsthand, as he was born in the 15th century. According to Mukhamedzhan Tynyshpaev, D˜ugosz's chronicle is unclear as to what kind of device or gas was used, giving only a description of a Chemical warfare noxious smell. Rather, he suggests, this is a repeat of the trope of the Mongols' bad smell as an excuse for their annihilation of European defenders. Research carried out on the collapsed tunnels at Dura-Europos in Syria suggests that the Iranians used bitumen and sulfur crystals to get it burning. When ignited, the materials gave off dense clouds of choking gases which killed 20 Roman soldiers in a matter of 2 minutes. One of the earliest such references is from Leonardo da Vinci, who proposed a powder of sulfide of arsenic and verdigris in the 15th century: throw poison in the form of powder upon galleys. Chalk, fine sulfide of arsenic, and powdered verdegris may be thrown among enemy ships by means of small mangonels, and all those who, as they breathe, inhale the powder into their lungs will become asphyxiated. It is unknown whether this powder was ever actually used. In the late 15th century, Spanish conquistadors encountered a rudimentary type of chemical warfare on the island of Hispaniola. Even when fires were not started, the resulting smoke and fumes provided a considerable distraction. Although their primary function was never abandoned, a variety of fills for shells were developed to maximize the effects of the smoke. The Maori withstood the bombardment and won the battle. The proposal was backed by Admiral Thomas Cochrane of the Royal Navy. It is considered a legitimate mode of warfare to fill shells with molten metal which scatters among the enemy, and produced the most frightful modes of death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill men without suffering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible. Chemical warfare War is destruction, and the more destructive it can be made with the least suffering the sooner will be ended that barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be used to lessen the suffering of combatants, and even of criminals condemned to death. Later, during the American Civil War, New York school teacher John Doughty proposed the offensive use of chlorine gas, delivered by filling a 10 inch 254 millimeter artillery shell with 2 to 3 quarts 2 to 3 liters of liquid chlorine, which could produce many cubic feet a few cubic meters of chlorine gas. Wikipedia:Avoid weasel words A general concern over the use of poison gas manifested itself in 1899 at the Hague Conference with a proposal prohibiting shells filled with asphyxiating gas. The proposal was passed, despite a single dissenting vote from the United States. The French were the first to use chemical weapons during the First World War, using the tear gases, ethyl bromoacetate and chloroacetone. One of Germany's earliest uses of chemical weapons occurred on October 27, 1914 when shells containing the irritant, dianisidine chlorosulfonate, were fired at British troops near Neuve-Chapelle, France. Deaths were light, though casualties relatively heavy. A total 50,965—tons of pulmonary, lachrymatory, and vesicant agents were deployed by both sides of the conflict, including chlorine, phosgene and mustard gas. Official figures declare about 1,176,500 non-fatal casualties and 85,000 fatalities directly caused by chemical warfare agents during the course of the war. A Canadian soldier with mustard gas burns, ca. To this day unexploded World War I-era chemical ammunition is still uncovered when the ground is dug in former battle or depot areas and continues to pose a threat to the civilian population in Belgium and France and less commonly in other countries. After the war, most of the unused German chemical warfare agents were dumped into the Baltic Sea, a common disposal method among all the participants in several bodies of water. Over time, the salt water Chemical warfare 42 causes the shell casings to corrode, and mustard gas occasionally leaks from these containers and washes onto shore as a wax-like solid resembling ambergris. Football team of British soldiers with gas masks, Western front, 1916 Interwar years In 1919, the Royal Air Force dropped mustard gas on Bolshevik troops. In 1920, the Arab and Kurdish people of Mesopotamia revolted against the British occupation, which cost the British dearly. As the Mesopotamian resistance gained strength, the British resorted to increasingly repressive measures. Much speculation was made about aerial bombardment of major cities with gas in Mesopotamia, with Winston Churchill, then-Secretary of State at the British War Office, arguing in favor of it. Notably, in the United States, the Protocol languished in the Senate until 1975, when it was finally ratified. The Bolsheviks also employed poison gas in 1921 during the Tambov Rebellion. This must be carefully calculated, so that the layer of gas penetrates the forests and kills everyone hiding there. See also: Chemical weapons in the Rif War In 1935, Fascist Italy used mustard gas during the invasion of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Ignoring the Geneva Protocol, which it signed seven years earlier, the Italian military dropped mustard gas in bombs, sprayed it from airplanes, and spread it in powdered form on the ground. According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Kentaro Awaya, gas developed in Germany 1939 weapons, such as tear gas, were used only sporadically in 1937 but in early 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army began full-scale use of sneeze and nausea gas red , and from mid-1939, used mustard gas yellow against both Kuomintang and Communist Chinese troops. For example, the Emperor authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate occasions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to October 1938. Those orders were transmitted either by prince Kotohito Kan'in or general Hajime Sugiyama. Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners Unit 731 and Unit 516. The Japanese also carried chemical weapons as they swept through Southeast Asia towards Australia. Some of these items were captured and analyzed by the Allies. Historian Geoff Plunkett has recorded how Australia covertly imported 1,000,000 chemical weapons from the United Kingdom from 1942 Imperial Japanese soldiers wearing gas masks and onwards and stored them in many storage depots around the country, rubber gloves during a chemical attack in the including three tunnels in the Blue Mountains to the west of Sydney. Buried chemical weapons have been recovered at Marrangaroo and Columboola. In 1923, Hans von Seeckt pointed the way, by suggesting that German poison gas research move in the direction of delivery by aircraft in support of mobile warfare. Also in 1923, at the behest of the German army, poison gas expert Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg negotiated with the USSR to build a huge chemical weapons plant at Trotsk, on the Volga river. Collaboration between Germany and the USSR in poison gas continued on and off through the 1920s. In 1924, German officers debated the use of poison gas versus non-lethal chemical weapons against civilians. Even before World War II, chemical warfare was revolutionized by Nazi Germany's discovery of the nerve agents tabun in 1937 and sarin in 1939 by Gerhard Schrader, a chemist of IG Farben. IG Farben was Germany's premier poison gas manufacturer during World War I, so the weaponization of these agents can not be considered accidental. The nerve agent soman was later discovered by Nobel Prize laureate Richard Kuhn and his collaborator Konrad Henkel at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical Research in Heidelberg in spring of 1944. Chemical troops were set up in Germany since 1934 and delivery technology was actively developed. Recovered Nazi documents suggest that German intelligence incorrectly thought that the Allies also knew of these compounds, interpreting their lack of mention in the Allies' scientific journals as evidence that information about them was being suppressed. Germany ultimately decided not to use the new nerve agents, fearing a potentially devastating Allied retaliatory nerve agent deployment. Shirer, in The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, writes that the British high command considered the use of chemical weapons as a last-ditch defensive measure in the event of a Nazi invasion of Britain. The whole affair was kept secret at the time and for many years after the war in the opinion of some, there was a deliberate and systematic cover-up. According to the U. The Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents were probably caused by napalm, not gas. There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fifteen gas bombs killed two people and injured thirty-five. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya, who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government denied using poison gas, and alleged that Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said it would welcome a UN investigation. On May 10, the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventy-five. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the gas was likely to have been halogenous derivatives - phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide. The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the Six-Day War of June, but resumed on July, against all parts of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustard and phosgene-filled aerial bombs caused approximately 1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries. Although the threat of global thermonuclear war was foremost in the minds of most during the Cold War, both the Soviet and Western governments put enormous resources into developing chemical and biological weapons. There is some evidence suggesting that Vietnamese troops used phosgene gas against Cambodian resistance forces in Thailand during the 1984-1985 dry-season offensive on the Thai-Cambodian border. In 1958 the British government traded their VX technology with the United States in exchange for information on thermonuclear weapons; by 1961 the U. Also in 1952 the U. During the 1960s, the U. One of these agents, assigned the weapon designation BZ, was allegedly used experimentally in the Vietnam War. Herbicidal warfare In 1961 and 1962 the Kennedy administration authorized the use of chemicals to destroy vegetation and food crops in South Vietnam. Between 1961 and 1967 the US Air Force sprayed 12 million US gallons of concentrated herbicides, mainly Agent Orange containing dioxin as an impurity in the manufacturing process over 6 million acres 24,000—kmš of foliage and trees, affecting an estimated 13% of South Vietnam's land. In 1965, 42% of all herbicides were sprayed over food crops. Besides destroying vegetation used as cover by the NLF and destroying food crops the herbicide was used to drive civilians into RVN-controlled areas. The use of Agent Orange may have been contrary to international rules of war at the time. It is also of note that the most likely victims of such an assault would be small children. A 1967 study by the Agronomy Section of the Japanese Science Council concluded that 3. United States chemical respiratory protection standardization In December 2001, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, CDC, NIOSH, National Personal Protective Technology Laboratory NPPTL , along with the U. Army Research, Development Engineering Command RDECOM , Edgewood Chemical and Biological Center ECBC , and the U. Department of Commerce National Institute for Standards and Technology NIST published the first of six technical performance standards and test procedures designed to evaluate and certify respirators intended for use by civilian emergency responders to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon release, detonation, or terrorism incident. Vietnam claims that the use of Agent Orange and other herbicides by the U. Chemical warfare traditional industrial respirator certification policy, next generation emergency response respirator performance requirements, and special live chemical warfare agent testing requirements of the classes of respirators identified to offer respiratory protection against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear CBRN agent inhalation hazards. These CBRN respirators are commonly known as open-circuit self-contained breathing apparatus CBRN SCBA , air-purifying respirator CBRN APR , air-purifying escape respirator CBRN APER , self-contained escape respirator CBRN SCER and loose or tight fitting powered air-purifying respirators CBRN PAPR. Unlike most of the studies discussed in this report, Operation Whitecoat was truly voluntary. Land tests in Alaska and Hawaii used artillery shells filled with sarin and VX, while Navy trials off the coasts of Florida, California and Hawaii tested the ability of ships and crew to perform under biological and chemical warfare, without the crew's knowledge. The hearings were chaired by Senator Max Cleland, former VA administrator and Vietnam War veteran. Developments by the Soviet government There have been numerous reports of chemical weapons being used during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, sometimes against civilians. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian chemist Vil Mirzayanov published articles revealing illegal chemical weapons experimentation in Russia. In 1993, Mirzayanov was imprisoned and fired from his job at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology, where he had worked for 26 years. In March 1994, after a major campaign by U. Because the precursors are generally significantly less hazardous than the agents themselves, this technique makes handling and transporting the munitions a great deal simpler. Additionally, precursors to the agents are usually much easier to stabilize than the agents themselves, so this technique also made it possible to increase the shelf life of the agents a great deal. Early in the conflict, Iraq began to employ mustard gas and tabun delivered by bombs dropped from airplanes; approximately 5% of all Iranian casualties are directly attributable to the use of these agents. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from firms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France. Many were hit by mustard gas. The official estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children Iranian soldiers had to use full PPE in front line and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood, lung of Iran-Iraq War and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to official reports. Of the 80,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions. Despite the fact that they did possess chemical weapons, Iraq did not use any chemical agents against coalition forces. The commander of the Allied Forces, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, suggested this may have been due to Iraqi fear of retaliation with nuclear weapons. The barrack buildings the weapons were used on proved to be deserted in any case. The British claim that more lethal, but legally justifiable as they are not considered chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, white phosphorus grenades were used. A skilled chemist can readily synthesize most chemical agents if the precursors are available. The earliest successful use of chemical agents in a non-combat setting was in 1946, motivated by a desire to obtain revenge on Germans for the Holocaust. The three applied an arsenic-containing mixture to loaves of bread, sickening more than 2,000 prisoners, of whom more than 200 required hospitalization. The organization, which turned out to be a single resident alien named Muharem Kurbegovic, claimed to have developed and possessed a supply of sarin, as well as 4 unique nerve agents named AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4S. A search of his apartment turned up a variety of materials, including precursors for phosgene and a drum containing 25—pounds of sodium cyanide. The following year, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing 12 and injuring over 5,000. On 29 December 1999, four days after Russian forces began assault of Grozny, Chechen terrorists exploded two chlorine tanks in the town. Because of the wind conditions, no Russian soldiers were injured. This threat was lent a great deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was obtained by the cable television network CNN in August 2002 showing, among other things, the killing of three dogs by an apparent nerve agent. All 42 of the terrorists and 120 of the hostages were killed during the raid; all but one hostage, who was killed, died from the effects of the agent. In early 2007 multiple terrorist bombings have been reported in Iraq using chlorine gas. These attacks have wounded or sickened more than 350 people. It is administered by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons OPCW , an intergovernmental organisation based in The Hague. In June 1997, India declared that it had a stockpile of 1044 tonnes of sulphur mustard in its possession. India's declaration of its stockpile came after its entry into the Chemical Weapons Convention, that created the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and on January 14, 1993 India became one of the original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. By 2005, from among six nations that had declared their possession of chemical weapons, India was the only country to meet its deadline for chemical weapons destruction and for inspection of its facilities by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. On May 14, 2009 India informed the United Nations that it has completely destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons. Iraq has also declared stockpiles of chemical weapons, and because of their recent accession is the only State Party exempted from the destruction time-line. The weapon stock mostly containing mustard gas-lewisite mixture. Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997, by far the largest arsenal, consisting of blister agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix, and nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested an extension on the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, financial, and environmental challenges of chemical disposal. This money will be used to complete work at Shchuch'ye and support the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Kizner Russia , where the destruction of nearly 5,700 tonnes of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million artillery shells and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a Green Cross Public Outreach Office, to keep the civilian population informed on the progress made in chemical weapons destruction activities. He issued a decree halting the production and transport of all chemical weapons which remains in effect. From May 1964 to the early 1970s the USA participated in Operation CHASE, a United States Department of Defense program that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal methods for chemical weapons was researched, with the U. In 1989 and 1990, the U. In April 1997, the United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, this banned the possession of most types of chemical weapons. It also banned the development of chemical weapons, and required the destruction of existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities, and their weapon delivery systems. In June 1990 the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of chemical agents stored on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacific, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Treaty came into effect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made an agreement with the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl to remove the U. In 1990, as part of Operation Steel Box, two ships were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing Sarin and VX where taken from the U. Bush committed the United States to destroying all of its chemical weapons and renounced the right to chemical weapon retaliation. In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Treaty, which required the destruction of all chemical weapon agents, dispersal systems, and production facilities by April 2012. Due to the destruction of chemical weapons, under the United States policy of Proportional Response, an attack upon the United States or its Allies would trigger a force-equivalent counter-attack. Since the United States only maintains nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is the stated policy that the United States will regard all WMD attacks Biological, chemical, or nuclear as a nuclear attack and will respond to such an attack with a nuclear strike. Destruction will not begin at the two remaining depots until after the treaty deadline and will use neutralization, instead of incineration. Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Tynyshpaev, Istoriya Kazakhskogo Naroda, Qazaq Universiteti, Almaty, 1993. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia - Past, Present, and Future, 1994. American Journal of Public Health. Brophy and George J. Fisher; The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959; L. Cochrane, The Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field 1959 ; and B. Birdsell, The Chemical Warfare Service in Combat 1966. Burck and Charles C. A volume in the Army Military History Series published in association with the Army History Unit. National Library of Medicine Chemical warfare agent potency, logistics, human damage, dispersal, protection and types of agents bomb-shelter. Both reactions release vast quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. Nuclear weapons are considered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and control have been a major focus of international relations policy since their debut. Only two nuclear weapons have been used in the course of warfare, both by the United States near the end of World War II. These two bombings resulted in the deaths of approximately 200,000 Nuclear weapon people…mostly civilians…from acute injuries sustained from the explosions. Since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons have been detonated on over two thousand occasions for testing purposes and demonstrations. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to have detonated nuclear weapons…and that acknowledge possessing such weapons…are chronologically by date of first test the United States, the Soviet Union succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia , the United Kingdom, France, the People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. In addition, Israel is also widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, though it does not acknowledge having them. Fission weapons All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear fission reactions. Weapons whose explosive output is exclusively from fission reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom bombs abbreviated as A-bombs. This has long been noted as something of a misnomer, as their energy comes from the nucleus of the atom. The latter approach is considered more sophisticated than the former and only the latter approach can be used if the fissile material is plutonium. A major challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a significant fraction of the fuel is consumed before the weapon destroys itself. The amount of energy released by fission bombs can range from the equivalent of less than a ton of TNT upwards of 500,000 tons 500 kilotons of TNT. Many fission products are either highly radioactive but short-lived or moderately radioactive but long-lived , and as such are a serious form of radioactive contamination if not fully contained. Fission products are the principal radioactive component of nuclear fallout. The most commonly used fissile materials for nuclear weapons applications have been uranium-235 and plutonium-239. Less commonly used has been uranium-233. Neptunium-237 and a number of isotopes of americium may be usable for nuclear explosives as well, but it is not clear that this has ever been implemented, and even their plausible use in nuclear weapons is a matter of scientific dispute. Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as thermonuclear weapons or more colloquially as hydrogen bombs abbreviated as H-bombs , as they rely on fusion reactions between isotopes of hydrogen deuterium and tritium. All such weapons derive a significant portion, and sometimes a majority, of their energy from fission. Almost all of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it is more efficient. Nuclear weapon 57 Thermonuclear bombs work by using the energy of a fission bomb to compress and heat fusion fuel. In the Teller-Ulam design, which accounts for all multi-megaton yield hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a fission bomb and fusion fuel tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride in proximity within a special, radiation-reflecting container. When the fission bomb is detonated, gamma rays and X-rays emitted first compress the fusion fuel, then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed neutrons, which can then induce fission in materials not normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs, about half of the yield comes from the final fissioning of depleted uranium. This technique can result in thermonuclear weapons of arbitrarily large yield, in contrast to fission bombs, which are limited in their explosive force. The largest nuclear weapon ever detonated…the Tsar Bomba of the USSR, which released an energy equivalent of over 50 million tons 50 megatons of TNT…was a three-stage weapon. Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space and weight requirements. For example, a boosted fission weapon is a fission bomb that increases its explosive yield through a small amount of fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the efficiency of the fission bomb. Some weapons are designed for special purposes; a neutron bomb is a thermonuclear weapon that yields a relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount of neutron radiation; such a device could theoretically be used to cause massive casualties while leaving infrastructure mostly intact and creating a minimal amount of fallout. The detonation of any nuclear weapon is accompanied by a blast of neutron radiation. Surrounding a nuclear weapon with suitable materials such as cobalt or gold creates a weapon known as a salted bomb. This device can produce exceptionally large quantities of radioactive contamination. Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions without requiring a fission bomb to initiate them. Such a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear weapons than one that required development of fission weapons first, and pure fusion weapons would create significantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear weapons, since they would not disperse fission products. Air Force funded studies of the physics of antimatter in the Cold War, and began considering its possible use in weapons, not just as a trigger, but as the explosive itself. Additionally, development and maintenance of delivery options is among the most resource-intensive aspects of a nuclear weapons program: according to one estimate, deployment costs accounted for 57% of the total financial resources spent by the United States in relation to nuclear weapons since 1940. They were very large and could two nuclear weapons used in warfare, was as a gravity bomb, dropped only be delivered by heavy bomber aircraft from bomber aircraft. This is usually the first method that countries developed, as it does not place many restrictions on the size of the weapon and weapon miniaturization requires considerable weapons design knowledge. It does, however, limit attack range, response time to an impending attack, and the number of weapons that a country can field at the same time. With the advent of miniaturization, nuclear bombs can be delivered by both strategic bombers and tactical fighter-bombers, allowing an air force to use its current fleet with little or no modification. This method may still be considered the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery; the majority of U. While even short range missiles allow for a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles SLBMs has given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success. More advanced systems, such as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles MIRVs , can launch multiple warheads at different targets from one missile, reducing the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough to fit onto a missile, though, can be difficult. An atomic mortar was also tested at one time by the United States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs , such as the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the difficulty of combining sufficient yield with portability limits their military utility. Nuclear weapon 59 Nuclear strategy Nuclear warfare strategy is a set of policies that deal with preventing or fighting a nuclear war. The policy of trying to prevent an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known as the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike capability the ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with one of its own and potentially to strive for first strike status the ability to completely destroy an enemy's nuclear forces before they could retaliate. During the Cold War, policy and military theorists in nuclear-enabled countries worked out models of what sorts of policies could prevent one from ever being attacked by a nuclear weapon. Different forms of nuclear weapons delivery see above allow for different types of nuclear strategies. The goals of any strategy are generally to make it difficult for an enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike against the weapon system and difficult to defend against the delivery of the weapon during a potential conflict. Sometimes this has meant keeping the weapon locations hidden, such as deploying them on submarines or rail cars whose locations are very hard for an enemy to track and other times this means protecting them by burying them in hardened bunkers. Other components of nuclear strategies have included using missile defense to destroy the missiles before they land or implementation of civil defense measures using early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas before an attack. Note that weapons designed to threaten large populations, or to generally deter attacks are known as strategic weapons. Weapons designed for use on a battlefield in military situations are called tactical weapons. There are critics of the very idea of nuclear strategy for waging nuclear war who have suggested that a nuclear war between two nuclear powers would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the significance of nuclear weapons is purely to deter war because any nuclear war would immediately escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in mutually assured destruction. This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism. Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment have questioned the usefulness of such weapons in the current military climate. According to an advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996, the use of or threat of use of such weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, but the court did not reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use would be lawful in specific extreme circumstances such as if the survival of the state were at stake. Perhaps the most controversial idea in nuclear strategy is that nuclear proliferation would be desirable. This view argues that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons successfully deter all-out war between states, and they are said to have done this during the Cold War between the U. The prospect of mutually assured destruction may not deter an enemy who expects to die in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a stateless terrorist instead of a sovereign nation, there is no fixed nation or fixed military targets to retaliate against. It has been argued, especially after the September 11, 2001 attacks, that this complication is the sign of the next age of nuclear strategy, distinct from the relative stability of the Cold War. Each missile could contain up to ten nuclear warheads shown in red , each of which could be aimed at a different target. These were developed to make missile defense very difficult for an enemy country. Nuclear weapon 60 Governance, control, and law Because of the immense military power they can confer, the political control of nuclear weapons has been a key issue for as long as they have existed; in most countries the use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the head of government or head of state. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and called created in 1957 to encourage peaceful for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions to international conflict. A few days after the release, philanthropist Cyrus S. Eaton offered to sponsor a conference…called for in the manifesto…in Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthplace. This conference was to be the first of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, held in July 1957. By the 1960s steps were being taken to limit both the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and the environmental effects of nuclear testing. The Partial Test Ban Treaty 1963 restricted all nuclear testing to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, while the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 1968 attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of non-military nuclear technology to member countries without fear of proliferation. A testing ban imposes a significant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country. Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreements between countries. Many nations have been declared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuclear weapons production and deployment are prohibited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco 1967 prohibited any production or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Treaty of Pelindaba 1964 prohibits nuclear weapons in many African Nuclear weapon countries. As recently as 2006 a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was established amongst the former Soviet republics of Central Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons. The court ruled that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would violate various articles of international law, including the Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In view of the unique, destructive characteristics of nuclear weapons, the International Committee of the Red Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are never used, irrespective of whether they consider them lawful or not. In the wake of the tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, economic sanctions were temporarily levied against both countries, though neither were signatories with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the stated casus belli for the initiation of the 2003 Iraq War was an accusation by the United States that Iraq was actively pursuing nuclear arms though this was soon discovered not to be the case as the program had been discontinued. In 1981, Israel had bombed a nuclear reactor being constructed in Osirak, Iraq, in what it called an attempt to halt Iraq's previous nuclear arms ambitions; in 2007, Israel bombed another reactor being constructed in Syria. Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or reduce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSR. Ukrainian workers use equipment provided by the U. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to dismantle a Soviet-era missile silo. After the end of the Cold War, Ukraine and the other non-Russian, post-Soviet republics relinquished Soviet nuclear stockpiles to Russia. Proponents of nuclear disarmament say that it would lessen the probability of nuclear war occurring, especially accidentally. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it would undermine the present nuclear peace and deterrence and would lead to increased global instability. These officials include Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William Perry. In January 2010, Lawrence M. Instead Waltz argues that it would probably be the best possible outcome, as it would restore stability to the Middle East by balancing Israel's regional monopoly on nuclear weapons. Mueller has also argued that the threat from nuclear weapons, by terrorists and governments alike, has been exaggerated, both in the popular media and by officials. It also promotes disarmament efforts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the weapons of choice in contemporary conflicts. Controversy Even before the first nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and the U. The question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons, or test them, has been continually and nearly universally controversial. Demonstration against nuclear testing in Lyon, France, in the 1980s. Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was first drawn to public attention in 1954 when the Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacific Proving Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon. Radioactive fallout became less of an issue and the anti-nuclear weapons movement went into decline for some years. Over half was spent on building delivery mechanisms for the weapon. When long term health and clean-up costs were included, there was no economic advantage over conventional explosives. In 2008 the worldwide presence of new isotopes from atmospheric testing beginning in the 1950s was developed into a reliable way of detecting art forgeries, as all paintings created after that period may contain traces of caesium-137 and strontium-90, isotopes that did not exist in nature before 1945. Nuclear explosives have also been seriously studied as potential propulsion mechanisms for space travel see Project Orion and for asteroid deflection. Specifically the US B83 nuclear bomb, with a yield of up to 1. See also Mordechai Vanunu The best overall printed sources on nuclear weapons design are: Hansen, Chuck. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. San Antonio, TX: Aerofax, 1988; and the more-updated Hansen, Chuck. Swords of Armageddon: U. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945. Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1995. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940. See also Estimated Minimum Incurred Costs of U. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011. Accessed 27 May 2010. India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed the Treaty. Spying on the bomb: American nuclear intelligence from Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea. New York: Norton, 2006. The Doomsday Clock Still Ticks, Scientific American, January 2010, p. Anti-nuclear Movements: A World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy, Longman, p. Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, pp. Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, p. Profiles in Power: The Anti-nuclear Movement and the Dawn of the Solar Age, Twayne Publishers, pp. Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear Power, Oxford University Press, p. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved February 22, 2012. The Road from Los Alamos. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from Cold War Weaponry. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons third edition. Government Printing Office, 1977. Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Washington, D. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History. The Swords of Armageddon: U. Sunnyvale, CA: Chukelea Publications, 1995. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. Office of Technology Assessment, May 1979. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995. The Making of the Atomic Bomb. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. The Rise of Nuclear Fear. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. One version, known as a dirty bomb, is not a true nuclear weapon and does not yield the same explosive power. It uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material, most commonly the spent fuels from nuclear power plants or radioactive medical waste. Another version is the salted bomb, a true nuclear weapon designed to produce larger amounts of nuclear fallout than a regular nuclear weapon. Radiological weapon 69 Explanation Radiological weapons of mass destruction have been suggested as a possible weapon of terrorism used to create panic and casualties in densely populated areas. They could also render a great deal of property useless for an extended period, unless costly remediation were undertaken. The radiological source and quality greatly impacts the effectiveness of a radiological weapon. Factors such as: energy and type of radiation, half-life, longevity, availability, shielding, portability, and the role of the environment will determine the effect of the radiological weapon. Radioisotopes that pose the greatest security risk include: 137Cs, used in radiological medical equipment, 60Co, 241Am, 252Cf, 192Ir, 238Pu, 90Sr, and 226Ra. All of these isotopes, except for the final one, are created in nuclear power plants. While the amount of radiation dispersed from the event will likely be minimal, the fact of any radiation may be enough to cause panic and disruption. The amount necessary to cause death to a person inhaling the material is extremely small. It has been estimated that one millionth of a gram accumulating in a person's body would be fatal. There are no known methods of treatment for such a casualty.... It cannot be detected by the senses; It can be distributed in a dust or smoke form so finely powdered that it will permeate a standard gas mask filter in quantities large enough to be extremely damaging.... Areas so contaminated by radioactive dusts and smokes, would be dangerous as long as a high enough concentration of material could be maintained.... These materials may also be so disposed as to be taken into the body by ingestion instead of inhalation. Reservoirs or wells would be contaminated or food poisoned with an effect similar to that resulting from inhalation of dust or smoke. Four days production could contaminate a million gallons of water to an extent that a quart drunk in one day would probably result in complete incapacitation or death in about a month's time. Radiological weapon 70 The United States, however, chose not to pursue radiological weapons during World War II, though early on in the project considered it as a backup plan in case nuclear fission proved impossible to tame. Some US policymakers and scientists involved in the project felt that radiological weapons would qualify as chemical weapons and thus violate international law. Deployment One possible way of dispersing the material is by using a dirty bomb, a conventional explosive which disperses radioactive material. Dirty bombs are not a type of nuclear weapon, which requires a nuclear chain reaction and the creation of a critical mass. Whereas a nuclear weapon will usually create mass casualties immediately following the blast, a dirty bomb scenario would initially cause only minimal casualties from the conventional explosion. Means of radiological warfare that do not rely on any specific weapon, but rather on spreading radioactive contamination via a food chain or water table, seem to be more effective in some ways, but share many of the same problems as chemical warfare. October 30, 1943 memo from Drs. Conant, Compton, and Urey to Brigadier General L. Groves, Manhattan District, Oak Ridge, Tennessee; declassified June 5, 1974. Military uses Radiological weapons are widely considered to be militarily useless for a state-sponsored army and are initially not hoped to be used by any military forces. Firstly, the use of such a weapon is of no use to an occupying force, as the target area becomes uninhabitable due to the fallout caused by radioactive poisoning of the involved environment. Furthermore, area-denial weapons are generally of limited use to an attacking army, as it slows the rate of advance. Dirty bombs A dirty bomb is a radiological weapon dispersed with conventional explosives. There is currently as of 2007 an ongoing debate about the damage that terrorists using such a weapon might inflict. Many experts believe that a dirty bomb such that terrorists might reasonably be able to construct would be unlikely to harm more than a few people and hence it would be no more deadly than a conventional bomb. Furthermore, the casualties would be a result of the initial explosion, because alpha and beta emitting material needs to be inhaled to do damage to the human body. Gamma radiation emitting material is so radioactive that it can't be deployed without wrapping an amount of shielding material around the bomb that would make transport by car or plane impossible without risking detection. Because of this a dirty bomb with radioactive material around an explosive device would be almost useless, unless said shielding was removed shortly before detonation. This is not only because of the effectiveness but also because this material would be easy to clean up. Furthermore, the possibility of terrorists making a gas or aerosol that is radioactive is very unlikely because of the complex chemical work to achieve this goal. On the other hand, some believe that the fatalities and injuries might be in fact much more severe. This point was made by physicist Peter D. Zimmerman King's College London who reexamined the Goi¬nia accident which is arguably comparable. As far as is publicly known none has ever been built. Four countries besides the five recognized Nuclear Weapons States have acquired, or are presumed to have acquired, nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. None of these four is a party to the NPT, although North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, then withdrew in 2003 and conducted announced nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, and 2013. One critique of the NPT is that it is discriminatory in recognizing as nuclear weapon states only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 and requiring all other states joining the treaty to forswear nuclear weapons. The United States was the first and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August 1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research. In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test. Non-proliferation efforts Early efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition of known uranium stores the Combined Development Trust , and at times even outright sabotage…such as the bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a German nuclear program. None of these efforts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima. Security Council could veto, and which would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons or fissile material. Nuclear proliferation Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA in 1957. Although these efforts stalled in the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee ENDC finished negotiations on the text of the NPT. In June 1968, the U. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373 XXII , and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970. Since the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non-proliferation efforts has been to maintain, and even increase, international control over the fissile material and specialized technologies necessary to build such devices because these are the most difficult and expensive parts of a nuclear weapons program. The main materials whose generation and distribution is controlled are highly enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisition of these special materials, the scientific and technical means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary, but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to be within the reach of industrialized nations. Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA now operates a safeguards system as specified under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT of 1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium, plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but other factors, such as national prestige, or specific historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping nuclear proliferation. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that they can be used to make nuclear weapons if a country chooses to do so. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb program. These include the five Nuclear Weapons States NWS recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the United States. Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, and India the latter two have since tested nuclear weapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an unacknowledged nuclear weapons state. North Korea was once a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The legality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of 9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capability to make a nuclear explosive device. International Atomic Energy Agency The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements to provide assurance to the international community that individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection. They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced by nuclear reactors not be refined into a form that would be suitable for bomb production. Scope of safeguards Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key element in the international system which ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes. Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation. The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceful activities. The system relies on; 1. This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review and verification of operating records. Nuclear proliferation All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope safeguards. In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states India, Pakistan and Israel , facility-specific safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records. The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures. While traditional safeguards easily verified the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the 1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities, Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors not commercial electricity-generating reactors and a reprocessing plant to produce some weapons-grade plutonium. The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards. Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were detected and brought under control using international diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process. In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement. With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it had nuclear weapons. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the civil fuel cycle. Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others required further legal authority to be conferred through an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons states have agreed to accept the principles of the model additional protocol. This will include any suspect location, it can be at short notice e. This will involve greater judgement on the part of IAEA and the development of effective methodologies which reassure NPT States. As of 20 December 2010, 139 countries have signed Additional Protocols, 104 have brought them into force, and one Iraq is implementing its protocol provisionally. While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. A further concern is that countries may develop various sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions would then be likely. IAEA safeguards, together with bilateral safeguards applied under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less likely. The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation. Other developments The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classified as a 'special nuclear material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States' intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy hydrogen isotope is used to boost the efficiency of fissile materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed tritium production in 2003 for the first time in 15 years. This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays. In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any further fissile material for weapons. This aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of 1996 not entered into force as of 2011 and to codify commitments made by the United States, the UK, France and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as well as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification. Khamenei's official statement was made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA in Vienna. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear weapons research and construction. They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities. In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided treaty in favor of the nuclear powers. Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile, and the risks of nuclear conflict between them have long been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since 1948. There is persistent low level military conflict due to Pakistan backing an insurgency there and the disputed status of Kashmir. Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s, including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: India, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States. But it is the growth and modernization of China's nuclear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear power programme and, reportedly, with missile technology, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, Pakistan is aided by China's People's Liberation Army, which operates somewhat autonomously within that country as an exporter of military material. India Nuclear power for civil use is well established in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle, necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT. This self-sufficiency extends from uranium exploration and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as a nuclear fuel. India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commercial operation, two larger ones under construction, and ten more planned. Construction has been seriously delayed by financial and technical problems. The first unit is due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power supplied 3. Its industry is largely without IAEA safeguards, though a few plants see above are under facility-specific safeguards. As a result India's nuclear power programme proceeds largely without fuel or technological assistance from other countries. Both use local uranium, as India does not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India may have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for a hundred nuclear warheads. It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce fissionable materials for their weapons; however, this is not accurate. Both Canada by supplying the 40 MW research reactor and the United States by supplying 21 tons of heavy water supplied India with the technology necessary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS Canada-India Reactor, United States. India, in violation of these agreements, used the Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy water to produce plutonium for their first nuclear explosion, Smiling Buddha. In addition, an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under development. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then universally perceived, notwithstanding official denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons. In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of reaching targets in China's industrial heartland. In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head off a proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were five more tests in Operation Shakti. India has had an unhappy relationship with China. After an uneasy ceasefire ended the 1962 war, relations between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since then a degree of high-level contact has been established and a few elementary confidence-building measures put in place. China still occupies some territory which it captured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India, and India still occupies some territory claimed by China. Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a major bone of contention. Bush met with India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's involvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries agreed that the United States would give nuclear power assistance to India. If the world's community failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear blackmail, these countries would be constraint to launch atomic bomb programs of their own!... Butt being the director. Later after joining, the Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents of the technology. Khan had brought from Urenco was based on first generation civil rector technology, filled with many serious technical errors, though it was authentic and vital link for centrifuge Nuclear proliferation project of the country. Seismic events consistent with these claims were recorded. In 2003, the IAEA unearthed a large-scale controversial nuclear scandal with close ties to Pakistan. Khan's efforts also led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who defied export restrictions in 1970s, and many of defunct Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to Pakistan as early as 1976. Confessing his crimes later a month on national television, he bailed out the government by taking full responsibility. He duly confessed of running the atomic proliferation ring from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea. He was immediately given presidential immunity. However, it was believed that North Korea was diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore freeze its plutonium programme. During this period, Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in missile technology transfer was being established. In 1993, PM Benazir Bhutto repeatedly traveled to China, and the paid state visit to North Korea. The visits are believed to be related to the subsequent acquisition technology to developed 82 Nuclear proliferation its Ghauri system by Pakistan. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile cooperation program with North Korea was under Dr. At this time China was under U. It is believed by experts that possibly with Chinese connivance and facilitation, the latter was forced to approach North Korea for missile transfers. It is not clear what North Korea got in return. The KRL was in charge of both uranium program and also of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear technology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated. Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange of personnel, technology and components between KRL and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Committee responsible for weapons production. A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted U. Separate reports indicate The Washington Times, 22 November 2002 that U. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment capability for nuclear weapons for at least five years and had used technology obtained from Pakistan Washington Times, 18 October 2002. Israel Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based on estimates of the amount of fissile material produced by Israel. Its construction commenced in 1958, with French assistance. The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and the majority of defense experts have concluded that it does in fact do that. Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. The British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960. Israel agreed, but on a condition that U. Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary false walls and other devices before each inspection. The inspectors eventually informed the U. In 1969, the United States terminated the inspections. In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Israel's nuclear program. He was freed on 21 April 2004, but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal charges were not immediately filed. British nuclear weapons scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for about 150 weapons. Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional five power conference to consider non-proliferation in South Asia. India has taken the view that solutions to regional security issues should be found at the international rather than the regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals. Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, proposed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nuclear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an international convention to ban the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as the 'cut-off' convention. The United States for some years, especially under the Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear weapons programs and to accept comprehensive international safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference of the five nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India and Pakistan. India refused this and similar previous proposals, and countered with demands that other potential weapons states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited, and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if they were accepted equally by China. The United States would not accept the participation of Iran and North Korea and these initiatives have lapsed. Another, more recent approach, centers on 'capping' the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this end, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN General Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotiations for a 'cut-off' convention. Should India and Pakistan join such a convention, they would have to agree to halt the production of fissile materials for weapons and to accept international verification on their relevant nuclear facilities enrichment and reprocessing plants. It appears that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding such a Cut-off Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament. Bilateral confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation have been limited. In 1990 each side ratified a treaty not to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate. Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the 'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as well as nuclear installations. Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. Indian ratification may be conditional upon the five weapons states agreeing to specific reductions in nuclear arsenals. Nuclear proliferation 85 NPT signatories Egypt In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In 2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium particles were found in environmental samples taken in Egypt. States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular effort by IAEA to attempt to detect them. Iraq had been making efforts to secure a nuclear potential since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant, Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. Special inspections can be undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be undeclared material or activities. After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a nuclear weapons design programme. The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the development of technology for electromagnetic isotope separation EMIS of indigenous uranium. This uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer albeit on a much larger scale. Ions of uranium-238 and uranium-235 are separated because they describe arcs of different radii when they move through a magnetic field. This process was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was abandoned soon afterwards. The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya, and none at Ash Sharqat. Nuclear proliferation The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichment, and had been able to acquire some components including some carbon-fibre rotors, which they were at an early stage of testing. In May 1998, Newsweek reported that Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs, which were apparently confiscated by the UNMOVIC officials. Khan, fearing an ISI sting operation, due to strained relations between two countries. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid 1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN, so the IAEA withdrew from this work. The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve. Myanmar A report in the Sydney Morning Herald and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of acquiring its first nuclear bomb in five years. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months, until April 1992. While this was a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt 50 MWe , and a full-scale version of about 800 MWt 200 MWe. They made only slow progress; construction halted on both in 1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded considerably since that time and would take significant efforts to refurbish. That plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons. One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant had been used more often than the DPRK had declared, which suggested that the DPRK could have weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State as required by the IAEA supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites. In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT three months' notice is required. In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. This was rejected by IAEA. Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had been completed. However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor have remained under close surveillance. Following bilateral negotiations between the United States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK remains uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement. While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-fire conditions, the DPRK was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures, such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely afford to import anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil, would either be ineffective or risk provoking war. This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced U. In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT. In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK, the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan, the United States and Russia were held in Beijing; the first beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's weapons program. On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However, by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party talks because the United States froze certain DPRK international financial assets such as those in a bank in Macau. On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 December 2006, the six-party talks finally resumed. Reacting to UN sanctions imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May 2009. On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear explosion with an estimated yield of 6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude 4. See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction and Six-party talks Russia Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya a test place for Soviet nuclear weapons using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow. With economic conditions the way they are in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a nuclear bomb. At the time, the state had a nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only had research reactors. The IAEA's initial verification task was complicated by South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and 1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA declared that it was satisfied all materials were accounted for and the weapons programme had been terminated and dismantled. South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then verifiably dismantled them. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside the U. W76 nuclear warhead fitted in some U. The renewal of this agreement is due to take place through the second decade of the 21st century. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age 1961 that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear weapons could increase international stability. Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along the lines of Gallois though these scholars rarely acknowledge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries. Specifically, these scholars advocate some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the world. Total proliferation In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction MAD should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. This was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow would risk nuclear Armageddon to advance territorial or power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued Waltz and Sagan 2003 , p. Waltz believes there to be no reason why this effect would not occur in all circumstances. If this does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break out on the European continent Mearsheimer 1990 , pp. Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some countries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not affiliated with any governments. Such countries would not have the political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments. Arguments against both positions There are numerous arguments presented against both selective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very neorealist assumptions such as the primacy of military security in state agendas, the weakness of international institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic integration and globalization to state strategy its proponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's specific example of Europe, many economists and neoliberals argue that the economic integration of Europe through the development of the European Union has made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an effective deterrent. Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has led or will lead to the development of a nascent European identity, which most states on the European continent wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU regard war between them as unthinkable.